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A	hard	Brexit	will	see	criminals	taking	back	control
How	will	Brexit	affect	British	security?	A	hard	Brexit	would	see	both	the	UK	and	its	European
partners	lose	access	to	much-needed	information,	but	even	a	soft	Brexit	will	come	at	a	price.	Gijs	de
Vries	(LSE)	explains.		
What’s	the	price	for	Brexit?	Whatever	it	takes,	as	Brexiteers	would	have	it?	A	hard	Brexit	would	see
Britain	crash	out	of	dozens	of	EU	agencies,	instruments,	and	data	systems.	Criminals	would	be
taking	back	control,	in	Britain	as	in	the	rest	of	Europe.	Conflicts	around	Europe	would	become	more
difficult	to	manage;	Russia	and	China	would	expand	their	power	at	Europe’s	expense.	Can	such	a	scenario	be
avoided?	
Perhaps	it	still	can.	Recent	developments	suggest	that	common	sense,	historically	associated	with	British	policy-
making,	may	be	enjoying	something	of	a	revival.	In	her	most	recent	speeches	Theresa	May	has	adopted	a	more
constructive	tone	than	before.	The	change	from	hectoring	is	welcome.	Atmospherics	are	no	substitute	for	policy,	but
they	do	matter.
Fortunately,	there	have	been	changes	in	substance,	too,	including	in	the	area	of	security.	Less	than	a	year	ago,	May
issued	a	thinly	veiled	threat	to	the	EU:	work	with	Britain	or	face	the	consequences	in	terms	of	(your)	security.	Britain’s
Article	50	letter	to	the	EU	was	widely	regarded	as	a	crude	attempt	to	blackmail	the	EU.	According	to	the	renowned
former	British	ambassador	to	the	EU,	Sir	Stephen	Wall,	the	letter	originally	contained	even	tougher	language	and
had	to	be	toned	down.
A	different	Theresa	May,	it	seemed,	took	the	floor	at	the	February	Munich	Security	Conference.	Barbs	against
presumed	EU	ideology	aside	the	speech	contained	much	that	was	constructive	and	sensible.	The	Prime	Minister
called	for	the	two	sides	to	consult	each	other	regularly,	to	coordinate	and	deliver	operationally	on	the	ground,	and	to
work	together	on	developing	the	capabilities	–	in	defence,	cyber	and	space	–	to	meet	future	threats.	The	UK,	May
said,	was	open	to	contributing	to	EU	mechanisms,	including	development	programmes,	post-Brexit.	And	when
participating	in	EU	agencies	such	as	Europol	the	UK	would	respect	the	remit	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice.
Whereas	this	went	down	well	in	the	rest	of	Europe,	other	sections	of	the	speech	raised	eyebrows.	There	would	need
to	be	an	EU-UK	treaty	which	offered	“a	principled	but	pragmatic	solution	to	close	legal	cooperation	(…)	to	respect	our
unique	status.”	The	UK	demanded	“a	future	relationship”	with	the	European	Defence	Fund	and	the	European
Defence	Agency,	whose	budget	the	UK	has	long	fought	to	curtail.	And	the	UK	wanted	“an	open	and	inclusive
approach	to	European	capability	development	–	that	fully	enables	British	defence	industry	to	participate.”	Cake,
anyone?
That	said,	the	speech	signals	a	growing	recognition	in	London	that,	in	terms	of	its	security,	the	UK	needs	the	EU	as
much	as	the	EU	needs	the	UK	–	and	an	implicit	rebuff	to	the	many	pundits	who	cleave	to	the	opposite	point	of	view.
One	such	opinion-leader,	former	MI6	head	Sir	Richard	Dearlove	dismissed	continental	intelligence	agencies	as	“the
leakiest	ships	of	state.”	The	European	Arrest	Warrant,	too,	was	pretty	useless:	“few	would	note	its	passing.”	A	similar
sense	of	English	superiority	can	occasionally	be	caught	wafting	through	the	corridors	of	Whitehall.	Theresa	May,	to
her	credit,	does	not	regard	it	a	sound	basis	for	policy.
However,	renegotiating	the	UK’s	security	relationship	with	the	EU	will	prove	a	formidable	undertaking.	Politicians,	as
well	as	journalists,	still	tend	to	underestimate	what	Brexit	will	mean	for	policing,	judicial	cooperation,	and	counter-
terrorism.	They	also	fail	to	appreciate	the	amount	of	work	needed	to	stave	off	the	threat.
After	Brexit	the	UK	will	lose	influence.	Its	police	forces	and	intelligence	services	also	risk	losing	access	to
information.	Continued	access	to	information	will	come	at	a	price.
Of	course,	bilateral	intelligence	cooperation	between	the	UK	and	other	EU	countries	is	not	regulated	by	the	EU	and
would	continue	as	before.	The	UK	would	also	stay	a	member	of	the	Counter-Terrorist	Group,	which	brings	together
the	intelligence	and	security	services	of	the	EU	member	states,	Norway	and	Switzerland,	and	of	the	‘SIGINT	Seniors’
(the	UK,	Canada,	Australia,	New	Zealand,	the	USA,	plus	Belgium,	Denmark,	France,	Germany,	Italy,	the
Netherlands,	Spain	and	Sweden).	However,	Britain	will	lose	access	to	IntCen,	the	EU’s	Brussels-based	centre	for
strategic	intelligence	analysis.
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Were	the	UK	to	leave	Europol	UK	police	forces	would	lose	access	to	Europol’s	Information	System,	the	Bomb	Data
System,	the	EU	Internet	Referral	Unit	and	other	much-needed	information.	The	National	Crime	Agency,	Britain’s
Financial	Intelligence	Unit,	would	lose	access	to	the	EU’s	network	of	FIUs,	which	is	based	at	Europol.	This	would
serve	neither	Britain’s	interests	nor	those	of	its	European	partners.	So,	the	UK’s	wish	to	stay	involved	is	well-
understood.	But	as	a	non-EU	country	Britain	would	no	longer	be	entitled	to	a	seat	on	the	Management	Board.	At
best,	it	may	have	to	settle	for	non-voting	observer	status.	British	police	officers	could	no	longer	expect	to	lead
Europol	teams.
Eurojust	coordinates	criminal	investigations	and	prosecutions,	including	into	terrorism,	where	it	supported	74	cases
in	2017.	Post	Brexit	the	UK	will	lose	its	seat	in	the	college,	but	will	it	request	to	appoint	a	liaison	officer	like	Norway,
Liechtenstein,	and	other	countries?	The	Governments	policy	paper	on	security	cooperation	offers	little	clarity.
The	UK	may	also	wish	to	renegotiate	its	role	in	the	European	Union	Agency	for	Network	and	Information	Security
(Enisa),	which	is	responsible	for	cybersecurity,	including	protection	from	state-sponsored	cyber-attacks	and
espionage,	and	cyber	crisis	management.	As	a	third	country	the	UK	could	participate	in	the	work	but	would	not	be
represented	on	the	Management	Board.
The	European	Global	Navigation	Satellite	Systems	Agency	(GNS)	manages	Galileo,	the	EU’s	global	satellite	system,
which	provides	securely	encrypted	services,	including	the	Public	Regulated	Service	for	security	operators	(police,
border	control,	and	others)	in	EU	member	states.	The	Galileo	Satellite	Security	Monitoring	Centre,	currently	located
in	Swanwick	(UK),	will	move	to	Madrid.	As	it	leaves	the	EU,	Britain	will	lose	the	senior	positions	it	currently	holds	in
GNS.	Does	it	still	see	a	role	for	itself?
At	the	end	of	the	transition	period,	the	Commission	warns,	the	UK	will	no	longer	have	access	to	any	EU	network,	any
information	system,	and	any	database.	These	include	SIS	II,	which	gives	police	forces	access	to	information	about
people	(some	35,000	wanted	on	a	European	Arrest	Warrant)	and	stolen	property	such	as	cars,	passports,	and
firearms.	ECRIS,	or	the	European	Criminal	Records	Information	System,	let	countries	share	criminal	records	in
Europe.	For	example,	if	a	British	person	is	convicted	of	a	crime	in	Spain,	then	the	Spanish	authorities	will	send
details	of	that	crime	to	the	UK	where	they	will	be	stored	on	the	local	criminal	records	system.	FADO	allows	for	the
rapid	sharing	between	EU	countries	of	images	of	genuine,	false	and	forged	passports,	visas,	driving	licences,	and
other	documents,	as	well	as	information	on	forgery	techniques	and	national	false	document	alerts.	Will	British	police
forces	retain	access	to	European	Passenger	Name	Record	data	(PNR)?	What	about	access	to	DNA	profiles	stored
in	other	European	countries	(Prüm	System)?	How	does	London	intend	to	limit	these	consequences	of	Brexit?
Public	Domain
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Some	issues	may	be	relatively	easy	to	solve,	such	as	continued	British	membership	of	the	EU	Internet	Forum,	an
informal	alliance	of	EU	member	states,	Europol,	EU	experts	and	private	companies,	or	British	participation	in	the
Radicalisation	Awareness	Network	(RAN)	and	the	European	Strategic	Communications	Network	(ESCN),	which
share	best	practice	on	countering	violent	extremism.	Should	it	wish	to	remain	part	of	the	criminal	justice	response	to
radicalisation	through	the	European	Judicial	Training	Network,	the	UK	will	have	to	pay	into	the	EU	budget.
Other	nuts	will	be	more	difficult	to	crack.	To	tackle	terrorism	and	other	forms	of	cross-border	crime	the	UK	will	have
to	renegotiate	its	status	under	a	slew	of	criminal	law	instruments,	such	as	the	European	Investigation	Order,	under
which	EU	countries	exchange	information	in	criminal	cases.	For	example,	if	the	UK	is	tracking	terrorist	suspects	in
Belgium,	it	can	request	the	Belgian	authorities	to	interrogate	witnesses	or	conduct	house	searches	in	its	behalf.	The
UK	has	suggested	it	would	like	to	continue	using	the	European	Arrest	Warrant.	What	about	the	European
Protection	Order,	which	allows	court	protection	orders	made	in	criminal	cases	in	one	member	state	to	be	enforced
in	another?	What	about,	for	example,	the	Framework	Decisions	on	mutual	recognition	of	financial	penalties,	custodial
sentences,	supervision	measures,	and	confiscation	orders?	Each	of	these	legal	instruments,	which	apply	to	EU
member	states,	will	have	to	be	changed	–	a	complicated,	time-consuming	process.
To	protect	British	security	the	UK	will	need	to	stay	closely	connected	to	EU	institutions	and	instruments.	But	even	this
soft	Brexit	will	come	at	a	price.	The	UK	will	lose	both	power	and	influence.	It	will	no	longer	have	a	voice	in	EU
legislation	and	decision-making	on	terrorism,	crime,	foreign	policy	or	security.	Furthermore,	to	the	extent	it	wants
access	to	EU	agencies,	instruments	and	data	systems	the	UK	will	still	be	required	to	share	sovereignty	and	accept
the	jurisdiction	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice.	It	will	also	have	to	pay	up.	This	is	what	a	soft	Brexit	implies:	a
degree	of	taxation	without	full	representation.
In	the	end,	this	bric-a-brac	may	just	about	enable	security	cooperation	between	the	UK	and	the	rest	of	Europe	to
continue.	But	make	no	mistake:	cooperation	will	become	more	cumbersome	and	messy,	and	a	predictable	source	of
mutual	acrimony.	Britain	will	trade	security	for	the	semblance	of	sovereignty.Neither	a	hard	nor	a	soft	Brexit	will
benefit	public	security.	The	clock	is	ticking.	How	long	will	it	take	for	reality	to	sink	in?
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	of	the	LSE.	
Gijs	de	Vries	is	a	Visiting	Senior	Fellow	at	the	LSE.	He	is	the	former	European	Union	Counter-Terrorism	Co-
ordinator	and	a	former	member	of	the	Dutch	Government.
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